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Contingency Enhancements in Attorney

Fee Cases: City of Burlington v. Dague,
the End of the Merit Systems Protection
Board's Struggle to Understand and
Apply Delaware Valley II
Cameron P. Quinn*
Katharine A. Klos**
The Supreme Court's recent decision in City of Burlington v.
Dague,' by disallowing all enhancements to the lodestar fee awarded
under federal fee-shifting statutes, simplified immeasurably the administration of federal fee-shifting attorney fee awards involving contingency
fee agreements. Before some rush to overturn Dague legislatively and
again award enhancement for cases taken on contingency involving
federal fee-shifting statutes, they should review courts' experiences with
the market approach, the means used to award contingency enhancements immediately prior to Dague, before designating the market
approach as the model. Other alternatives may prove easier to administer and a better use of scarce judicial resources.
This article, in addition to examining the breadth of the holding of
Dague (Section V), will explain prior Supreme Court guidance (Section
II), highlight circuit court case law prior to Dague (Section III), and
highlight the experience of the Merit Systems Protection Board (the
Board) (Section IV), a federal agency with nationwide jurisdiction over
the federal civil service, .which attempted to interpret and apply the
market approach test outlined in the most recent prior Supreme Court
pronouncement on contingency enhancements, Pennsylvania v.
Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley II).2
This article concludes that the market approach to awarding contin* Counsel to the Chairman, Merit Systems Protection Board; J.D. University of

Virginia.
** Senior Attorney, Merit Systems Protection Board, Office of Appeals Counsel;
J.D. University of North Carolina.

1. 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992).
2. 483 U.S. 711 (1987) (plurality opinion) [hereinafter Delaware Valley II].

gency enhancements taken in Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in
Delaware Valley H was virtually impossible to square with earlier
Supreme Court guidance, and that the approach of Dague is practical
and principled. It recognizes, however, that some may wish to overturn
Dague on policy grounds, and so cautions that the market approach is
not the best alternative to achieve such a policy reversal (Section VI).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Prior to Dague, the fee award in contingency fee cases could be
enhanced, or increased, under federal fee-shifting statutes, which
obligate the government to pay the prevailing party's reasonable
attorney fees. Contingency agreements most commonly provide that a
client will pay counsel's fee only if the case is won, and that the payment will be a percentage of the client's monetary recovery.' In cases
involving federal fee-shifting statutes, however, the government pays the
fee to a prevailing attorney not based on a percentage of recovery, but
on the "lodestar," which is the amount derived by multiplying the
lawyer's customary hourly billing rate by the number of hours devoted
to the case.4 Beginning in 1984 when the Supreme Court adopted the
lodestar model in Blum v. Stenson, this method of fee calculation
became standard federal government practice. The lodestar is awarded
regardless of whether the attorney and client had entered into an
hourly agreement, a contingency agreement, or an agreement that set
counsel's fee as a percentage of the client's financial recovery.
Use of the lodestar raised the following issues: Whether it compensated for coansel's risk of nonpayment under contingency agreements;
and, if it did not, whether the lodestar award should be augmented by
paying winning counsel retained under a contingency agreement the
lodestar fee plus an additional amount, a "contingency enhancement,"
often calculated as a percentage of the lodestar, to offset this risk.
Before Dague, courts had generally concluded that Delaware Valley H

3. The Merit Systems Protection Board's (the Board) experience with contingency
agreements is somewhat different. Agreements may, upon successful prosecution of
the appeal, call for such arrangements as merely the payment of the statutory fees
awarded, or for the statutory fees plus some additional amount such as a percentage
of the back pay award, or a multiplier of the statutory fees awarded.
4. See Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
487 F.2d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 1973). In Lindy, the court awarded fees in an action
under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988 & Supp. 1990). The court viewed a
lower court's use of factors other than the hours spent by counsel and his hourly
rate as making meaningful review of attorney fee awards difficult, and giving little
guidance to attorneys and claimants. This case thereby effectively adopted the lodestar method of computing attorney fees. Lindy, 487 F.2d at 168.
5. 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
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required such contingency enhancements.
Having concluded that contingency enhancements were required to
compensate attorneys for the risk of non-payment in contingency cases
in order to award a "reasonable" fee as required by most federal
fee-shifting statutes, the next question was how to determine such
contingency enhancements. Prior to 1987, many courts and administrative adjudicators compensated for counsel's assumed risk of
non-payment in cases involving contingency agreements by assessing
the risk of loss at the time that the attorney and client entered into the
contingency agreement.' After 1987, when the Supreme Court issued
Delaware Valley II, courts and administrative adjudicators attempted to
apply the market approach outlined in Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion in that case.!
]I.

THE SUPREME COURT'S FORMER
PENNSYLVANIA

PosmoN:

V. DELAWARE VALLEY

CITIZENS' COUNCIL FOR CLEAN AIR

From 1987 until the issuance of Dague in June 1992, Delaware Valley
II dictated the standards for the award of contingency enhancements
under federal fee-shifting statutes.' That case concerned an award of attorney fees under a federal fee-shifting statute' to a citizens' group
which successfully sued the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania over provisions of the Clean Air Act.' The Supreme Court reversed the Third
Circuit's decision, which had doubled the lodestar for certain phases of
the litigation to reward the plaintiffs' attorneys for assuming the risk of

6. See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.
1974); Andress v. Department of Transp., 23 M.S.PB. 260 (1984).
7. Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 731 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
8. In Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clear Air v. Pennsylvania, 478 U.S. 546
(1986) [hereinafter Delaware Valley I], the predecessor of Delaware Valley II, the Supreme Court examined the issues of whether the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410
(1988 & Supp. 1990), authorizes attorney fee awards for time spent by counsel participzag in regulatory proceedings in addition to time spent in litigation, and whether a court may enhance an award to reflect the superior quality of representation.
Delaware Valley 1, 478 U.S. at 548. See also The Scope of Attorney's Fees Under
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 14 EcoLOGY L.Q.
517, 517-39 (1987). This article does not concern the issues decided in Delaware
Valley L
9. There are currently more than 100 federal fee-shifting statutes. For a list of
many of these statutes, see Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 44-51 (1985).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 7410.

loss.
Justice White, writing on behalf of a plurality that included Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Powell and Scalia, concluded that
Congress did not intend to permit enhancement of an otherwise reasonable lodestar to compensate an attorney for assuming the risk of loss in
a contingency case." Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion, agreed
with the plurality that the district court had erred in augmenting the
lodestar amount with a contingency enhancement award in that case.'"
But she also agreed with four dissenting Justices that Congress intended to permit contingency enhancements when computing reasonable
attorney fees under fee-shifting statutes.'3 Justice Blackmun, joined by
Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens, reasoned that Congress intended to allow contingency enhancements under fee-shifting statutes in
order to "place contingency employment as a whole on roughly the
same economic footing as noncontingency practice."" Thus, no single
opinion reflected the views of a majority of the Court.
Due to various cross endorsements among the three opinions in Delaware Valley II, courts began to rely on the market approach test, formulated in Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, which called for
enhancements based on a market treatment of contingency agreements
as a class. This market approach was determined to be the controlling
view, because it was endorsed in Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion. 6"' Almost all circuits," including the Federal Circuit, adopted the
market approach test in some fashion.
The market approach, according to Justice O'Connor's opinion, required courts to base contingency enhancements on the local or other
relevant market's treatment of contingent fee cases as a class. Under
the market approach, court determinations of how a particular market
compensated for contingency should control future cases involving the
same market. If a fee applicant attempted to prove that the relevant
market provided greater compensation for contingency than other markets previously provided, the applicant needed to point to differences
between those markets which would justify the different rates of compensation. The fee applicant bore the burden of proving the degree to

11. Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. 711, 727-31 (plurality opinion).
12. Id. at 733 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
13. Id. at 731 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id at 735-40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 745-46 (Blaclmun, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 733-34 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See, e.g., Fadhl v. City and County of
San Francisco, 859 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1988). But see King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771
(D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3054 (1992).
16. In King v. Palmer, discussed in the text below, the District of Columbia
Circuit adopted the plurality opinion in Delaware Valley H as the opinion of the
Court.
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which the relevant market compensated for contingency. However, a
court could not enhance a fee award any more than necessary to bring
the fee within the range that would attract competent counsel. Furthermore, no enhancement is appropriate unless the applicant can establish
that, without an adjustment for risk, the prevailing party would have
faced substantial difficulties in finding counsel in the local or other
relevant market. Finally, no enhancement should be based on the novelty or complexity of a particular case.17
Practical experience with the market approach shows some flaws in
its implementation, however. As the circuit courts' experiences show,
over time, once the proof requirements are mastered, application of the
market approach leads to contingency enhancement in virtually all
cases. Additionally, fulfilling proof requirements is likely to turn the
fees portion of the case into full blown litigation every time a locality's
or market's contingency enhancement percentage is being set or amended.
Ill.

PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN CIRCUIT COURT
INTERPRETATIONS OF DELAWARE VALLEY II

As circuit courts attempted to implement the market approach outlined by Justice O'Connor in Delaware Valley II, conflicts with other
well-established Supreme Court precedent became apparent. These
included the discovery that using such a market approach could well
lead to the award of risk premiums as the rule, not the exception, contrary to Blum v. Stenson."8 The market approach test was also likely to
convert the attorney fee phase of federal cases into major litigation,
contrary to long-standing Supreme Court guidance in Hensley v.
Eckerhart.' The circuit courts resolved neither of these problems prior

17. Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. 711, 731-34 (1987).
18. 465 U.S. 886, 898-901 (1984). Awarding attorney contingency enhancements as
the rule appears to be the result of the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion, see Fadhl, 859 F.2d at 650-51; D'Emanuele v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 904 F.2d 1379, 1384 (9th Cir. 1990), and was the result of
the District of Columbia Circuit's interpretation of that opinion before its decision in
King. See, e.g., McKenzie v. Kennickell, 875 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
19. 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). See also Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 722 (fee litigation "should be simplified to the maximum extent possible"); Save Our Cumberland
Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516, 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that the case
came to court in 1981: and between 1985 and 1988 the litigation revolved solely
around attorney's fees, inconsistent with the Supreme Court's guidance that attorney

to the issuance of Dague.
Additionally, there was no circuit court consensus on how to apply
the market approach of Delaware Valley IT' Even after five years of
interpretation, two basic evidentiary questions of any practicing lawyer
were left unsettled: What do I need to show to prove entitlement to a
contingency enhancement? What showing is necessary to establish a
specific multiplier?
Some circuit courts directly followed Justice O'Connor's market approach, which treated contingency cases as a class, without reference
to the Court's plurality opinion. These courts used different tactics,
however, to apply the market approach, differing most notably on the
quantum of proof required of the party seeking a contingency enhancement. Contrasting decisions of the Third and Ninth Circuits most clearly
illustrate this dichotomy.
2
The Third Circuit, in Blum v. Witco Chemical Corporation,
discussed the difficulties of proof it envisioned for parties seeking a contingency enhancement. In Blum, the court remanded the attorney fee
aspect of the case for consideration of a contingency enhancement.'
The court instructed that, on remand, the plaintiffs must develop an
evidentiary presentation that would probably require expert testimony
from someone familiar with the economics of the legal profession,
perhaps an expert econonist.' The court suggested that it might even
be necessary to develop an econometric model' of the market practice
regarding contingency cases in order to prove the market practice.2

fee proceedings not be a second major litigation).
20. This premise appears to be borne out by the difference between the Eleventh
Circuit's view of Delaware Valley H and the interpretation given Delaware ValleyI H
by the district courts within the Eleventh Circuit. Although the Eleventh Circuit in
Norman v. Housing Authority of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir. 1988), took a
very restrictive view of when a contingency enhancement was appropriate, a number
of district courts within the Eleventh Circuit awarded handsome contingency enhancements, often of 1009. See Alice M. Bradley & Bryan Essary, Comment, The Treatment
of Attorney's Fee Enhancements in Alabama and the Eleventh Circuit: Justice! The
Law My Ducats and My Daughter!, 20 CUMB. L REV. 769, 787-93 (1990).
21. 829 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1987). In Blum, the jury found a violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. 1992). Blum,
829 F.2d at 370.
22. Id. at 383.
23. Id. at 380.
24. Id, An econometric model would apply statistical methods to the economic
data of contingency legal practice. See generally WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY, 262 (1965).
25. Blum, 829 F.2d at 380. Subsequently, in Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177
(3d Cir. 1990), the Third Circuit reiterated its earlier holding that plaintiffs bear the
burden of establishing entitlement to a contingency enhancement, and held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that three affidavits, indicating
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In contrast to the difficulty of proof envisioned by the Blum court,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court's award of a 100 percent
enhancement of the lodestar fee award based on a much lighter evidentiary showing in Fadhl v. City and County of San Francisco,' a case
involving only the question of a contingency enhancement." The court
relied solely on the following to prove entitlement to an enhancement:
A San FYancisco practitioner's testimony that his firm would generally
not accept a contingent fee case unless the anticipated fee, if successful, were equal to twice the value of the firm's services billed at a normal rate;" the Ninth Circuit's earlier acknowledgement that Title VIP
cases are especially unappealing to the private bar;' and the Fadhi
plaintiffs specific difficulty in retaining counsel."
Other circuit courts, while viewing Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion in Delaware Valley II as essentially controlling, sought to blend
her views with aspects of the plurality opinion. For example, in Leroy
v. City of Houston,' the Fifth Circuit held, following the plurality's
direction, that contingency enhancement awards were to be reserved
for exceptional circumstances.' Another circuit court, in denying a

how two attorneys treated contingency fee cases differently than hourly rate cases,
were insufficient to meet that evidentiary burden. Id. at 1184-85. The court opined
that the important failure was not the small number of the affidavits, but the quality
of their content Il at 1185. Reflecting on its earlier Blum opinion, the court noted
that "a single person, qualified as an expert and with the proper foundation, could
produce testimony that would satisfy the evidentiary requirements of Delaware Valley
I." I&
26. 859 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1988).
27. In an earlier decision, the court had affirmed the district court's finding of a

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988 & Supp.
1990), awarded a lodestar attorney fee, and reserved the issue of plaintiffs entitlement to a contingency enhancement Fadhl v. City and County of San Francisco, 804
F.2d 1097, 1099 (9th Cir. 1986).
28. Fadh/, 859 F.2d at 650-51. Subsequently, in D'Emanuele v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., Inc., 904 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit restated its adoption of
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Delaware Valley H and defined a contingent fee arrangement as an exceptional circumstance requiring the enhancement if Justice
O'Connor's test is met. Id. at 1384.
29. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000.
30. FadWi, 859 F.2d at 651.
31. Id, The plaintiff approached 35 lawyers before she found one who would
represent her. Id,
32. 831 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1987).
33. Id, at 583. The court did not define the term exceptional, but it found three
issues irrelevant to a determination of whether to award a risk enhancement: the

contingency enhancement, relied on the plurality's admonition that a
contingency enhancement award should be informed by the statutory
purpose of making it possible for "poor clients with good claims to

secure competent help."' Other circuit courts also cited the plurality's
finding in Delaware Valley II that, as a general rule, the contingency
enhancement should not be more than one third of the lodestar.'
Finally, one circuit court overturned a denial of enhancement, and
instructed district courts to account for the contingent nature of the
compensation by assessing the riskiness of litigation, which directly
contradicted Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion.'
In contrast to all other circuit courts, the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed its prior decisions which followed the market approach in
awarding contingency enhancements.37 Instead, it articulated an alternative view of Delaware Valley II which, in light of Dague, appears prescient. Five years after adopting Justice O'Connor's decision as controlling in Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel,' a case

unpopularity of the plaintiffs position; the difficulty of working with an obstreperous
plaintiff; and the importance of contingency enhancements to attracting lawyers to
civil rights cases. Id. at 584.
A similar approach is reflected in a decision of the Tenth Circuit, in Smith v.
Freeman, 921 F.2d 1120 (10th Cir. 1990). The court agreed with the Delaware Valley
II plurality that enhancement for the risk of nonpayment should be reserved for
exceptional cases where the need and justification for such enhancement are readily
apparent and supported by both evidence in the record and specific findings by the
courts. Id. at 1123.
Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit, in Norman v. Housing Authority, 836 F.2d 1292
(11th Cir. 1988), reserved contingency enhancements for exceptional circumstances.
Id. at 1302.
34. Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1404 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, North Carolina v. Spell, 484 U.S. 1027 (1988) (citing Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 730-31).
35. See, e.g., Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 876 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing
Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 730).
36. Skelton v. General Motors Corp., 860 F.2d 250, 258 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810 (1989). Considering the litigation risks of the particular case is the
plurality opinion's falback position in Part V of Delaware Valley II, which Justice
O'Connor specifically rejected.
37. King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Prior to its decision in King,
the District of Columbia Circuit issued a series of cases awarding contingency enhancements under the guidance of Delaware Valley II. See also Thompson v.
Kennickell, 836 F.2d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 848 F.2d
1265 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In McKenzie v. Kennickell, 875 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the
court had fully addressed the issue of contingency enhancements, and established a
regime in which contingency enhancements of reasonable attorney fees would be
routinely available under statutory fee-shifting statutes.
38. 826 F.2d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds, 857 F.2d 1516 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (en banc). The District of Columbia Circuit acknowledged the holding of
Delaware Valley II that a contingency multiplier could be awarded under attorney fee
statutes, but only if based upon an assessment of the market treatment of contingen-
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involving an award of attorney fees after a successful private enforcement action under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977,' the District of Columbia Circuit reversed itself in King v.
Palmer'
In King, a case involving attorney fees for a successful Title VII gender discrimination claim, the court rejected Justice O'Connor's opinion
in Delaware Valley II in favor of Justice White's plurality opinion."'
The King majority concluded that a reasonable lodestar fee awarded
under federal fee-shifting statutes may never be enhanced to compensate a prevailing party for the initial risk of loss.' The majority applied Marks v. United States," which held that when a fragmented
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result
erjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be
viewed as the position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgment on the narrowest grounds." The court held that, under
Marks, Justice O'Connor's opinion could be considered controlling only
if it narrowed the plurality's approach to the question.* The court
found under the Marks test that it could not consider Justice
O'Connor's concurrence as a subset of the plurality, because it adopted
a classwide approach to risk assessment while the plurality opinion did
not."6 Unlike the plurality, the court observed, Justice O'Connor
refused to allow the risks"" of an individual case to affect the enhancement question, opting for a market approach instead.' Thus, the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that her opinion described an altogether different approach, not a narrower one.' Hence, it was not

cy cases as a class, rather than an assessment of any particular case's degree of risk.
39. Hodel, 826 F.2d at 45-46 (finding a violation of 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a) (1982)).
40. King, 950 F.2d at 785.
41. Id at 775.
42. Id, at 784.

43. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
44. King, 950 F.2d at 782-83 (citing Marks, 430 U.S. at 193)).
45. Id. at 783.
46. Id,
47. In Delaware Valley II, the plurality defined risk as "measured by the risk of
losing rather than winning and depends on how unsettled the applicable law is with
respect to the issues posed by the case and by how likely it is that the facts could

be decided against the complainant." Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. 711, 715-16 (1992).
48. King, 950 F.2d at 783.
49. Id. at 777 (citing Marks, 430 U.S. at 193). The District of Columbia Circuit specifically rejected the position of the Third Circuit that Justice O'Connor's opinion can
be regarded as a subset of the dissent, and, as such, would speak for a majority of

controlling.
IV.

THE MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD'S

INTERPRETATION OF DELAWARE VALLEY II
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), ° which introduced
new management flexibility in the federal civil service, also established
the Merit Systems Protection Board to strengthen employee due process protections. The Board has jurisdiction over appeals from major
personnel actions made appealable by statute or by regulation of the
Office of Personnel Management affecting the vast majority of federal
career civil servants."
To help the Board accomplish its mission effectively, and to ensure
that innocent appellants and those with meritorious claims did not lose
their jobs because they could not afford legal assistance,' Congress
granted the Board authority to award attorney fees to prevailing appellants.' Under the CSRA, such fee awards are appropriate if: (1) Fees

the court. Id. (citing Student Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. AT & T Bell Lab.,
842 F.2d 1436, 1451 (3d Cir. 1988)).
50. Pub. L No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978) (codified as amended in various scattered sections of 5, 10, 15, 28, 31, 39, and 42 U.S.C.).
61. Under 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511-13 (1991), the Board has jurisdiction over appeals from
competitive service employees who are not serving a probationary period or have
completed one year of current contimious service not in a temporary appointment,
preference eligible excepted service employees who have completed one year of
current continuous service in the same or similar position, and other excepted service employees who have completed two years of current continuous service.
52. See generally Allen v. United States Postal Service, 2 M.S.P.R. 420, 429-30
(1980) (discussing purposes behind authority to grant attorney fees).
53. Initial appeals to the Board from federal employees, who are designated as
appellants for the Board's adjudicatory process, are heard and decided by administrative judges located in its eleven regional offices. Clark v. Department of the Navy, 12
M.S.P.R. 428 (1982). The full Board issues precedential decisions based on the parties'
petitions for review of the initial decisions issued by the administrative judges. 5
C.F.R. §§ 1201.114-1201.115 (1992). Judicial review of the Board's decisions is authorized by 5 U.S.C. § 7703 (1988 & Supp. 1990). The Merit Systems Protection Board
deems the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
which is the exclusive venue for judicial review of merit system appeals involving
only federal personnel matters, as controlling. The decisions of the other circuit
courts are persuasive, but not controlling authority. See Fairall v. Veterans Admin., 33
M.S.P.R. 33, affd, 844 F.2d 775 (Fed. Cir. 1987). However, Board appeals involving
discrimination allegations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-16, the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988), section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1988 & Supp. 1990), and sections 12 and 15 of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 631, 633a (1988 & Supp. 1990),
are heard by Federal District Courts, rather than the Federal Circuit, as provided in
the respective statutes. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7702(e)(1), 7703(b)(2) (1988).
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were "incurred";" (2) their payment is "warranted in the interest of
justice";' and (3) they are "reasonable."' For those who establish that
the employing agency engaged in prohibited race, sex (including equal
pay violations), color, national origin, age, or handicap discrimination,
reasonable attorney fee awards are available under Title VII standards,
which, while still requiring that fees be reasonable and incurred, do not
require proof that the fees are warranted in the interest of justice.67
Prior to Delaware Valley II, the Board only once awarded a contingency enhancement, using the standard of compensating only for the
risk of not being paid at all in the particular case. Prior to this award,
however, the Board in Kling v. Department of Justice,68 a
non-contingency case awarding attorney fees for a prevailing appellant,
developed some general guidelines for future parties to cases requesting

54. Fees are incurred when an attorney-client relationship exists between counsel
and an appellant, and counsel renders legal services on behalf of the appellant in an
appeal before the Board. O'Donnell v. Department of the Interior, 2 M.S.P.R. 445, 454

(1980).

55. In Alien, the Board set forth the following examples of situations where an
award of attorney fees would be "warranted in the interest of justice" under 5 U.S.C.
§ 7701(g) (1988): (1) Where the agency engaged in a "prohibited personnel practice";
(2) where the agency's action was "clearly without merit," or was "wholly unfounded," or the employee is "substantially innocent" of the charges; (3) where the agency
initiated the action against the employee in "bad faith"; (4) where the agency committed a "gross procedural error" that "prolonged the proceeding" or "severely prejudiced" the employee; or (5) where the agency "knew or should have known that it
would not, prevail on the merits" when it brought the action. Aien, 2 M.S.P.R. at 43435.
56. Reasonableness is an overarching principle in attorney fee cases. Even if the
fee request is well documented, if the amount proves unreasonable, it can be reduced
by the administrative judge who hears the case. The full Board on review gives great
deference to the administrative judge's reasonableness determination, though it, like
other findings of fact, can be overturned. In its early cases, the Board determined
that, although the amount of a reasonable attorney fee would be calculated by identification and consideration of the pertinent factors among the 12 identified in Johnson
v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974), most factors
are accounted for by two objective variables: (1) the lawyer's customary hourly
billing rate; and (2) the number of hours devoted to the case. King v. Department of
Justice, 2 M.S.P.R. 464, 471-73 (1980). Generally, the Board awards fees at the prevailing community rate for similar work. See Blumenson v. Department of Health &
Human Servs., 30 M.S.P.R. 644 (1986).
57. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; 5 U.S.C. §

7701(g)(2).
58. 2 M.S.P.R. 464 (1980).

attorney fees." The Board stated in King that when counsel's compensation is contingent on success, the Board would consider adjusting the
award upward to compensate for the risk the attorney had accepted of
not being paid at all in that particular case.' Subsequently, the Board
applied the guidelines in Andress v. Department of Transportation."
According due deference to the administrative judge, who favorably
assessed the risk factor involved and the conscientious and exemplary
representation by counsel, the Board found reasonable a contingency
enhancement equaling ten percent of back pay.'
While Delaware Valley II was pending before the Supreme Court,
Crumbaker v. Department of Labor (Crumbaker I),' a Board case denying contingency enhancement,' was pending before the Federal Circuit. In Crumbaker I, the Board denied the enhancement where counsel had accepted the case on contingency only after significant involvement while receiving payment at the hourly rate demonstrated that the
appellant would prevail, thus reducing the risk of loss to virtually zero.' Upon issuance of Delaware Valley II, the Federal Circuit remanded the case, instructing the Board to analyze the appellant's request for
a 100 percent contingency enhancement in light of Justice O'Connor's
opinion.' On remand, the Board concluded in Crumbaker v. Department of Labor (Crumbaker II)' that, in light of the Federal Circuit's
instructions, it would no longer assess the risk of a particular case to
determine an award of a contingency enhancement,' but would look
to "the difference in market treatment of contingent fee cases as a

class."*
Crumbaker II furnished guidance on three key issues in an area the

59. Id. at 472.
60. Id. at 473.
61. 23 M.S.P.R. 260 (1984). The Board held that, where the fee agreement provided
for an hourly rate of $75.00 divided among six appellants, plus 1096 of the combination of annual base pay and back pay, an upward adjustment of the lodestar by
10% of base pay and back pay was excessive, although an upward adjustment equal-

ing 1096 of back pay alone was reasonable. Id. at 264-65.
62. Id.
63. 24 M.S.P.R. 627 (1984) [hereinafter Crumbaker I].

64. Id at 635.
65. Id
66. Crumbaker v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 827 F.2d 761 (Fed. Cir. 1987). See also
Phillips v. General Servs. Admin., 924 F.2d 1577, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
67. 40 M.S.P.R. 71 (1989) [hereinafter Crumbaker II].
68. Id. at 80.
69. Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. 711, 730. Classified, or "across-the-board," risk enhancements employ a standard multiplier-unrelated to the contingencies of a particular case-for every case within a class of cases. See Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L.

REv. 119, 292 n.14 (1987) (citing John Leubsdorf, The Contingency Fee Factor in
Attorney Fee Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473, 501, 511 (1981)).
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Board was to learn was laden with numerous issues. It determined the
geographic market for which market treatment must be proved. ° It
determined the proof acceptable to show market treatment.7 ' It further
established that the appellant need not prove that counsel chosen was
the least expensive provider of services.'
The first issue the Board resolved in CrumbakerII was determining
which market to use in calculating the contingency enhancement. The
Board found that the relevant geographic market was where the appellant resided when the case arose and where the hearing was held,'
rather than where the appellant's counsel practiced. 4 Thus, in
Crumbaker II, the Board based its enhancement decision on evidence
of the treatment of contingent fee cases as a class in Seattle, Washington, and refused to consider such evidence from Dallas, Texas, where
the appellant's counsel practiced.75
Additionally, Crumbaker II addressed the amount of proof required
to show market treatment of contingency cases as a class." The appellant proffered two unrefuted affidavits in which Seattle attorneys described their area's practice regarding contingency fee cases. These
affidavits asserted that the hourly rates for successful contingency cases were twenty percent to forty percent higher than the rates usually
charged in noncontingency cases. The Board found this sufficient to
determine that a twenty percent contingency enhancement, the lowest
enhancement necessary to attract competent counsel, was appropri7
ate.

70. Crwmbaker II, 40 M.S.P.R. at 78-79.
71. Id.
72. Id at 80.
73. The Board has also held the parties may stipulate to the relevant market if the
hearing took place within the stipulated geographic area. Estate of Lizut v. Department of the Army, 51 M.S.P.R. 549, 556 (1991).
74. Determination of counsel's hourly rate for purposes of calculating the lodestar
award was based on his billing rate in the area where he practiced. Crumbaker I, 24
M.S.P.R. 627, 630 (1984).
75. Crunbaker II, 40 M.S.P.R. at 78-79.
76. Id.
77. Id. The proof required of the party seeking a contingency enhancement most
closely resembles the lighter Ninth Circuit requirement. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text. However, due to the Board's later adoption of Green v. Department
of the Navy, 43 M.S.P.R. 34, 38 (1989) (requiring the party requesting a contingency
enhancement to explain market differences that account for any difference in the rate
requested and enhancements already awarded by the Board), discussed further below,
the Board showed signs of developing a higher burden of proof to show entitlement

Finally, Crumbaker II established that the appellant need not prove
that his counsel was the least expensive in the market to receive a
contingency enhancement.' The agency argued that the Board should
deny the enhancement because appellant's counsel failed to establish
that competent attorneys, who generally charge less than the appellant's
counsel, declined to take the case. The Board held, however, that nothing in Delaware Valley II, or in Federal Circuit decisions, required the
appellant to show that another attorney refused to take his case at a
lower rate in order to merit a contingency enhancement.'
After it issued CrumbakerII, the Board remanded a series of cases
involving contingency agreements to its regional offices. The remands
instructed the parties to submit evidence on the issue of contingency
enhancement requests. These cases attempted to define some parameters of the parties' evidentiary burdens.' Subsequently, the Board addressed a number of other contingency enhancement issues. These
issues related to the practical questions a party had to answer to establish eligibility for an enhancement, and to prove the amount of the
enhancement.
In Wilkins v. Department of the Navy,8' the Board ruled on a threshold issue concerning the burden of production. The Board held that
because it requires neither a fee agreement to be in writing nor a copy
of such an agreement to be submitted in a fee petition,' the parties
could establish the existence of a contingency fee agreement through
an affidavit of counsel which detailed the nature of the contingency fee
agreement' The Board noted, however, that under such circumstances, counsel must establish the pertinent details of the agreement, such
as whether the fee agreement was entirely or partially contingent, and
the date on which the contingency agreement was executed."

to a contingency enhancement, one which more closely resembled the Third Circuit's
proof requirement.
78. Crumbaker I1,40 M.S.P.R. at 80.
79. 1d. This is consistent with a number of circuit court decisions. See, e.g., Morris
v. American Nat'l Can Corp., 952 F.2d 200 (8th Cir. 1991).
80. See Wilkins v. Department of the Navy, 51 M.S.P.R. 290 (1991); Lizut v. Department of the Navy, 42 M.S.P.R. 3, 9-10 (1989); Mercer v. Department of Health &
Human Services, 42 M.S.P.R. 115, 122, 123 (1989); Brooks v. Department of Transp.,
42 M.S.P.R. 125, 128 (1989); Craven v. Office of Personnel Management, 42 M.S.P.R.
128, 13637 (1989); Brown v. Department of Health & Human Services, 42 M.S.P.R.
291, 297 (1989); Hutchison v. Department of Health & Human Services, 42 M.S.P.R.
302, 310-11 (1989); Gonczi v. Office of Personnel Management, 41 M.S.P.R. 671, 676-77
(1989).

81. 51 M.S.P.R. 290 (1991).
82. Sprenger v. Department of the Interior, 34 M.S.P.R. 664, 668 (1987).

83. Wi/kins, 51 M.S.P.R. at 293.
84. Id.
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In Gonczi v. Office of Personnel Management,' the Board established that the appellant, as the party seeking the enhancement, had the
initial burden of proof of entitlement to contingency enhancement.'
Subsequently, the Board set forth a two-tier test to prove entitlement to
an enhancement in Broum v. Department of Health & Human Services.' In .Brown, the Board held that the appellant first must show that
the market compensated contingency agreements at a higher rate than
other fee agreements.' If this was proved, the appellant then needed
to document the higher rate.'
The Board decided two cases which provide additional guidance to
answer Broum's first tier question: Whether the market compensates
contingency agreements at a higher rate than other fee agreements.
First, in Crumbaker II the Board found that the relevant geographic
market was the location where the appellant resided when the case
arose and/or where the hearing was held.' Then, in Jones v. Department of the Navy,"' the Board determined the relevant product market.
In Jones, the Board determined that O'Connor's statements regarding
difficulties in finding counsel in the local or other relevant market compelled the inquiry of whether an appellant seeking representation in an
employment case, of the type heard by the Board, would find counsel
willing to accept the case on a contingency basis in the absence of a
contingency enhancement.' The Board concluded, probably based upon the type of practice of attorneys who generally appear before the
Board, that its relevant product market did not include all contingency
claims such as personal injury contingency claims. Rather, its relevant
product market included all employment law contingency claims in the
relevant geographic market.
In Brown, the Board did not reach the second tier of the test, the
issue of the rate of the appropriate contingency enhancement, in light
of the appellant's failure to establish that the relevant market compensated contingency fee arrangements at a higher rate than other work.

85. 41 1LS.P.R. 671 (1989).
86. Id. at 676 (citing Crumbaker v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 827 F.2d 761

(D.C. Cir. 1987)).
87. 50 M.S.P.R. 523 (1991).
88. Id. at 531-32.

89. Id
90. Grumbaker II, 40 M.S.P.R. 71, 78-79 (1989).
91. 51 M.S.P.R. 542 (1991).
92. Jones, 51 M.S.P.R. at 548.

Significantly, the Board did not consider court decisions awarding enhancements within the relevant market as evidence sufficient to establish the market treatment of contingency cases.'
Three Board decisions were relevant to the second question of the
Brown two-tier test regarding the appropriate contingency enhancement
rate. First, CrumbakerII found that two unrefuted affidavits, in which
local market attorneys described their locality's practice regarding contingency fee cases, were sufficient to establish the market rate for contingency cases.' However, in Green v. Department of the Navy, 5 the
Board held that if the attorney requesting the enhanced fee award prepared either affidavit, the two affidavits would be insufficient, without
more, to prove entitlement to an enhancement." Finally, the Board
adopted a rebuttable presumption that the maximum enhancement was
the one-third-of-the-lodestar maximum enhancement posited by the
plurality in Delaware Valley IL" Therefore, if an appellant showed that
the relevant market compensated contingency agreements at a higher
rate than other fee agreements, he also had to prove, inter alia, why
any rate exceeding one third of the lodestar would be warranted.
Most courts ignored Justice O'Connor's instruction in Delaware Valley II that "[dleterminations involving different markets should also
comport with each other... [and] the applicant should be able to point
to differences in the markets that would justify the different rates of
compensation."" The Board, however, applied this instruction. In
Green v. Department of the Navy," the Board held that contingency
enhancement fee applicants should be able to point to market differences that would justify their requests for different enhancement rates."°
The Board remanded Green to allow the appellant to provide detailed
evidence explaining the differences between his market and any other
markets in which the Board had awarded contingency enhancements.'' After Green, the Board remanded all other cases, as all failed

93. Brown v. Department of Health & Human Services, 42 M.S.P.R. 291 (1989).
94. Crumbaker II, 40 M.S.P.R. 71, 78-79 (1989).
95. 43 M.S.P.R. 34 (1989).
96. Id at 38. The case restated the rule that the Board had established in
Crumbaker II. In Crumbaker II the Board provided: The minimum evidence necessary to support a request for a contingency enhancement is affidavits from two attorneys not professionally affiliated with the employee's attorney who practice in the
relevant market. Crumbaker II, 40 M.S.P.R. at 80.
97. See Jones v. Department of the Navy, 51 M.S.P.R. 542, 548 (1991). The Board
adopted this position because the concept is consistent with Justice O'Connor's
opinion, and does not introduce new elements, such as exceptional circumstances.
98. Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 731.
99. 43 M.S.P.R. 34, 38 (1989).
100. Id. at 38.
101. Id. At the time Green was decided, the Board had made findings regarding
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to address market differences that would justify the different enhancement rates for further evidence on the issue."
The Board's efforts to apply Delaware Valley H in accordance with
the Federal Circuit's instructions held Board practitioners to strict
proof of their requests. Practitioners' evidence had to establish the
following: The existence of a contingency fee agreement between the
attorney and the client, and the date and terms of that agreement; the
relevant geographic and product market; that market's practice regarding employment cases accepted on a contingency fee basis, including
whether the market compensated such cases at a higher rate than
non-contingency cases, and what that rate was; the reasons for any
difference between that market's practice and the practice in other
miarkets in which the Board had awarded contingency enhancements;
and, if the market practice was to compensate contingency fee employment cases at a rate higher than one and one-third times the compensation of non-contingency cases, the justification for the amount over the
presumed maximum of one third of the lodestar.
In summary, in the five years after the issuance of Delaware Valley
II, the Board was able to determine and award a contingency enhancement in only one case due to all the questions that the market approach
raised. This suggests that the market approach test is not a particularly
good approach for dealing with contingency enhancement issues. Fortunately, the Supreme Court provided some additional guidance in this
area.
V.

THE COURT'S CURRENT POSITION:
CITY OF BURLINGTON V. DAGUE

In City of Burlington v. Dague,lu the Court, in a six-to-three opinion,
held that the typical federal fee-shifting statute does not permit an
attorney's fee award to be enhanced beyond the lodestar amount to
reflect the fact that a party's attorney was retained on a contingency-fee

only one market, Seattle; this market compensates successful contingency cases at
2096 above the cost of non-contingency cases. See Crumbaker II, 40 M.S.P.R. at 71.
102. Many of the cases requesting contingency enhancements are from only a few
attorneys. Though several cases have since come to the Board without the
now-required evidence of market differences, at least two of these cases are from the
attorney in Green, and most of these cases were originally submitted prior to the

issuance of Green.
103. 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992).

basis."' The Dague majority, therefore, adopted the plurality opinion
that Justice White authored in Delaware Valley IIV' The Court specifically rejected the market approach advocated in Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion in Delaware Valley II." The Court reasoned that
Justice O'Connor based her market approach in Delaware Valley II
upon mutually inconsistent propositions.' 7 On the one hand, the approach required parties seeking contingency enhancement to establish
that without the risk adjustment they would face substantial difficulties
in finding counsel in the relevant market, and on the other hand, it forbade enhancements based on the assessment of specific case riskiness.
The Court stated that this is a circular test for federal fee-shifting contingency fee cases because the market for most federal fee-shifting
cases is artificial, having been created by enacting fee-shifting statutes." Plaintiffs in many federal fee-shifting cases seek injunctive or
equitable relief. The market for these plaintiffs would not exist except
for the fee-shifting statutes. There was no way a market approach to
contingency fee awards could achieve the supposed goal of mirroring
market incentives of attorneys to take cases because that market is
driven by a factor that, under the market approach, cannot be used to
determine the contingency enhancement: namely, counsel's assessment
of the riskiness of an individual case."
The Court further opined that, beyond the market approach, the feeshifting statutes provide no other basis by which a court could restrict
contingency enhancement, if adopted, to fewer than all contingency-fee
cases." ° The Court stated that contingency enhancement is not compatible with the many fee-shifting statues because such enhancement
would, in effect, pay for the attorney's time (or anticipated time) where
his client does not prevail."' This seems to contravene the legislative
intent since the statutory language prevents recovery of fees by plaintiffs who do not prevail."' Additionally, the majority held that contingency enhancement is unnecessary to determine a reasonable fee, and
is inconsistent with the Court's rejection of the contingent-fee model in

104. Id. at 2645.
105. Compare id. with Delaware Valley 11, 483 U.S. 711 (1987).
106. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2645. See Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 733 (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
107. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2645. The majority in Dague specifically stated, regarding
the market approach in Delaware Valley II, "[W]e do not see how it can intelligently
be applied." Id, at 2649.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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favor of the lodestar model, because the lodestar model reflects
counsel's hourly rate and number of hours devoted to the case, and
inherently takes risk into account."' Finally, the.Court determined that
adopting contingency enhancement would make the setting of fees
more complex and arbitrary, thereby encouraging more litigation, something the Court has generally not supported."1
The majority opinion in Dague provides an extremely simplistic application: if attorney fees are awarded, then the lodestar is calculated."
This simplicity is in sharp contrast to the complex and difficult application of Delaware Valley I."'
Dague is far-reaching. The Court stated that its opinion disallowing a
contingency enhancement applied to all fee-shifting statutes that award
"reasonable" attorney fees."7 Indeed, the Court left no doubt that
Dague applied to the Civil Rights Attorney Fee Act,"8 Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,"' the Clean Air Act," ° and the specific statutes under which fees were awarded in the case before the Court,'
the Solid Waste Disposal Act " and the Clean Water Act." While the
Supreme Court did not list all the fee-shifting statutes, other courts will
almost certainly apply Dague to other fee-shifting statutes that the
Court did not identify. 2' Dague relied on the Supreme Court's empha-

113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 18-104.
117. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2655.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-Sk.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1988).
121. Dagae, 112 S. Ct. at 2693.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (1988).
123. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1988).
124. Dague applies to the Board's attorney fee cases. Pecotte v. Department of the
Air Force, M.S.P.R. Docket No. SF075289A 0240 (Aug. 25, 1992). In Peeotte, the Board
reasoned as follows: The Board "may require payment by the agency involved of reasonable attorney fees incurred by an employee . .. if the employee . . . is the prevailing party and the Board . .. determines that payment by the agency is warranted
in the interest of justice." 6 U.S.C. § 7701(g)(1). The Board may also award fees "[ijf
an employee or applicant is the prevailing party and the decision is based on a
finding of [prohibited] discrimination . . . ." 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g)(2). Furthermore, 5
U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1) (1988) prohibits personnel from discriminating against a federal
employee or applicant for employment based on race, sex (including equal pay violations), national origin, color, religion, age, handicap, marital status, or political affiliation. When the Board awards attorney fees based on a finding of discrimination, the

sis on "ready administratibility. " " In doing so, Dague eliminated the
subjectivity and uncertainty that had colored questions on contingency
enhancement. Thus, Dague provides the Board, other administrative
bodies, and the courts with a sure-footed and swift approach in attorney fee cases involving federal fee-shifting statutes.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun discussed some sound
points that are relevant to the broad application of Dague.'" The dissent contended that the majority view was inconsistent with the Court's
prior holding that a reasonable fee attorney's fee award should be fully
compensatory and should reflect the risk taken by attorneys regarding
the contingency of their compensation." 7 Moreover, Justice Blackmun
argued that to effect Congressional intent of attracting competent counsel to take cases arising under fee-shifting statutes, counsel must be
assured of receiving fees commensurate with those they could obtain in
other litigation."
VI.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE CIRCUIT COURTS'

AND THE BOARD'S EXPERIENCES FOR THE
FUTURE OF CONTINGENCY ENHANCEMENT

After Dague, incentives in addition to the lodestar award will be
available only through legislative intervention. As Justice Blackmun's
dissent in Dague noted, disallowing a contingency enhancement could
lessen the incentive of seasoned practitioners to take fee-shifting cases
on contingency and relegate such cases to less experienced counsel or

payment is in accordance with the standards prescribed under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(k).
Dague prohibits a contingency enhancement under Title VII. Thus, the Board
may not award a contingency enhancement under its authority to interpret the attorney fee provisions of that statute. Additionally, Dague prohibits the Board from
awarding a contingency enhancement under its own statutory authority. 5 U.S.C. §
7701(g)(1). The two bases of the Board's authority to award fees differ in that, to
receive a fee award absent a finding of discrimination, the party moving for a fee
award must also show that fees are warranted in the interest of justice. The additional requirement, however, does not materially modify the requirement that the fee
award be reasonable, and it provides no real basis to exclude a fee award from the
prohibition against contingency enhancements announced in Dague. Indeed, reasonableness is the overarching standard by which a fee award is to be measured. See
Jones v. Department of the Navy, 51 M.S.P.R. 542, 548 (1991); see also Blanchard v.
Bergeron, 109 S. Ct. 939, 944 (1989).
125. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2643.
126. Id. at 2646-47 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424, 435 (1983); Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 286 (1989)).
127. Id. at 2644 (Blaclaun, J., dissenting).
128. l at 2644-45 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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to no attorney at all, and could thus contravene the congressional intent
that fee-shifting statutes serve as an integral enforcement mechanism in
a variety of federal statutes."
While lack of a contingency enhancement to account for the risk of
loss may or may not reflect congressional intent, one implication bearing on contingency enhancements is clear from the circuit courts' and
the Board's experiences, and is further reflected by the Court in Dague.
That is, the market approach is the wrong approach either if contingency enhancements are to be the exception, not the rule, or if attorney
fee litigation is to remain secondary to the litigation of the merits of
cases brought under fee-shifting statutes.
Keeping contingency enhancements the exception rather than the
rule, as the Supreme Court has urged repeatedly, was beginning to look
like "paradise lost" after Delaware Valley II. No matter how cumbersome the procedure, once the parties moving for fee awards mastered
the evidentiary procedures, the market approach to enhancement
threatened to make risk premiums the rule as the Delaware Valley H
plurality warned." ° Classwide enhancements employ a standard multiplier for every case within a class of cases."' Virtually all legal communities can show both that the local market treats contingency cases differently by awarding a risk premium to successful contingency cases
and that it is more difficult to get attorneys to take contingency cases
without a risk enhancement.
If the legislature wants to assure contingency enhancements in the
most worthy cases by drafting legislation to award enhancements in all
contingency cases, it should do so directly,' as the market approach

129. Id (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
130. See Delaware Valley II at 727-31.
131. Commentators have recognized that in Delaware II the Supreme Court failed to
provide clear and complete guidelines to the lower courts in awarding contingency
enhancements and imposed strict burdens of proof on fee applicants. One law review
article urged Congress to amend fee-shifting statutes to provide specific methods for
computing contingency enhancements and to waive sovereign immunity with regard to
interest on reasonable lodestar attorney fees. This would provide prevailing attorneys
with a full and complete attorney fee award and the necessary incentive for private enforcement of congressional policies. See generally, Arthur J. Lackman, Attorney's Fee Contingency Edzancements: Toward a Complete Incentive to Litigate Under Federal FeeShifting Statutes-Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air,
107 S. Ct. 3078 (1987), 63 WASH. L. REV. 469, 469-92 (1988) (urging Congress to

amend fee-shifting statutes).
132. Id. at 2645-46.

is clearly not the best approach. It leads directly to the phenomenon
that the Board experienced, and the Court feared in Dague: that the
attorney fees portion of the case develops into full-blown litigation.
Board cases involving requests for contingency enhancements were
regularly remanded, sometimes twice remanded,n to the regional offices for additional proceedings. The attorney fee phase of the case
took on all the attributes of an independent, full-scale adjudication, sometimes, perhaps, dwarfing the merits phase of the case.'N Indeed, Justice O'Connor's requirement of an explanation of the difference between markets virtually compelled the development of expert economic
evidence for the first case in any market and all subsequent cases seeking to change the contingency enhancement standard set by the first
case.' The Third Circuit in Blum v. Witco" foresaw this development and articulated in dicta that the market approach raises the possibility that proof of contingency enhancements might require the moving
party's presentation of expert testimony from someone familiar with the
economics of the legal profession or an expert economist, and perhaps
the participation of interveners or amici." '
If there is consensus that the award of a lodestar fee alone is insufficient, drafters of legislation can avoid the problems associated with the
market approach by determining how much risk they wish to encourage
and by setting a contingency enhancement percentage accordingly.
There is no reason to spend scarce judicial resources litigating market
contingency enhancement percentages by market location for an artificial market.
However, if there is consensus that a standard for awarding contingency enhancement is desired in fewer than all federal fee-shifting contingency cases, thereby reserving enhancement for the "exceptional"
case, better alternatives than the market approach exist. For example,
the Board and courts have effectively used risk assessment of each
particular case to reserve contingency enhancements as the exception." Unfortunately, this too has the downside of possibly requiring

133. See, eg., Lizut v. Department of the Navy, 51 M.S.P.R. 549 (1991); Lizut v.
Department of the Navy, 42 M.S.P.R. 3, 9-10 (1989).
134. See Jones v. Department of the Navy, 51 M.S.P.R. 542 (1991); Wilkins v. Department of the Navy, 51 M.S.P.R. 290 (1991); Lizut, 51 M.S.P.R. 549.
135. As markets may be relatively small, many states consist of hundreds of markets. Additionally, any attempt to change a contingency enhancement percentage,
once set, would require extensive litigation.

136. 829 F.2d 367.
137. 1l at 380.
138. See, e.g., Kling v. Department of Justice, 2 M.S.P.R. 464, 473 (1980). Further,

review of many circuit court decisions which have attempted to follow the admonition of the Delaware Valley H plurality to reserve contingency enhancements for

[Vol. 20:1, 1992]

Contingency Enhancements in Attorney Fee Cases
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

extensive additional evidence. The comparative ease of adjudicating requests for contingency enhancements in early Board cases, which incorporated the risk of nonpayment in the individual case as a factor, contrasted sharply with the difficulty of adjudicating such cases under a
classwide analysis. Risk analysis is intrinsic to a particular case, while
the market approach is extrinsic, hence the need for additional fact
finding under the market approach. This contrast resonated the point
made by the District of Columbia Circuit in King v. Palmer," and ultimately by the Supreme Court in Dague: that special difficulties ensue
from removing risk of loss as a factor in determining whether to award
a contingency enhancement."
Risk assessment has the drawback, however, of allowing greater
reward to cases that may not effect the intent of the legislation underlying the fee-shifting statutory provision. Risk assessment may allow
greater reward to parties litigating cases which present issues that the
legislation was not intended primarily to remedy, but which may fit
within the broadest reading of the statute. Risk assessment also increases the probability that counsel who, on a contingency basis, represent
plaintiffs who bring the most worthy cases, i.e., the most likely to prevail, will not receive a contingency enhancement.'

exceptional circumstances reveals no definition of exceptional cases other than the
vagueness of "we will know it when we see it," and possibly leads to the result,
opposite to that of Justice O'Connor's opinion, that contingency enhancements will
never be awarded. See Hendrickson v. Branstad, 934 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1991); Smith
v. Freeman, 921 F.2d 1120 (10th Cir. 1990); Leroy v. City of Houston, 831 F.2d 576,
583 (5th Cir. 1987). In light of this, if legislation is drafted to assure the award of
contingency enhancements and to reserve them as the exception, the law should indicate what kind of circumstances would be exceptional.
139. 950 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
140. See City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638, 2642-43 (1992); King, 950
F.2d at 780.
141. Absent legislative intervention, practicing attorneys could use at least two approaches to effect the intent of Congress to encourage attorneys to represent clients
with claims arising under fee-shifting statutes by being retained on a contingency basis, and to receive full compensation without enhancing the lodestar. Attorneys could
negotiate a premium from their clients, in addition to the lodestar, if the attorney is
successful. The Supreme Court has stated that "depriving plaintiffs of the option of
promising to pay more than the statutory fee if that is necessary to secure counsel
of their choice would not further the general purpose of enabling such plaintiffs to
secure competent counsel." See Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 89-90 (1990). Also,
attorneys could draft retainer agreements charging contingency clients an hourly rate
that reflect-; the rate counsel commands in his contingency practice, and seek fee
awards at that hourly rate. This rate is usually higher than that set for clients who

VII.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, the Board's and circuit courts' contingency fee case experiences furnished a body of evidence showing that the Supreme Court's
clarification of its position on awarding contingency enhancements in
Dague was timely, if not overdue. These experiences also provide evidence of the pitfalls of the market approach as a component of reasonable attorney fees under federal fee-shifting statutes.
In our view, if legislation is drafted to assure that fee-shifting statutes
provide for enhancing the lodestar attorney fee award in all cases
where counsel is retained under a contingency agreement, it should
take a straightforward approach to assure a fully compensatory fee.
Setting a particular percentage of enhancement for all contingency fee
cases under federal fee-shifting statutes or paying interest on fees as
they accrue would reflect the market as effectively as, and certainly
more efficiently than, the market approach. If awarding enhancements
in fewer than all cases is the preferred legislative solution, using a risk
analysis would certainly be preferable to the market approach, although
it too has its problems.
Experience shows that with a market approach to contingency enhancements, courts, administrative adjudicators, and practicing attorneys waste valuable public and private resources determining what is
"reasonable." These are resources that, as pressure increases to reduce
federal expenditures while increasing public service, can be better
spent on other things than litigating a reasonable fee.

pay as work is done. This alternative, however, could involve proof problems such as
those involved in proving a fee under the market approach.

